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Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric
Medical Clinic, Inc.: Negligent Infliction
of Emotional Distress Bounces Out of
Bounds
Since the thirteenth century, the law of torts has been concerned
with the allocation of losses arising out of human activities.' Losses
to peace of mind and emotional tranquility, however, have been slow
to gain recognition as an independent tort.2 Facing the fear of
fictitious claims and the threat of unlimited liability, courts afforded
protection for emotional distress only when accompanied by a sep-
arate tort, such as assault, battery, or false imprisonment. 3 Eventually
courts recognized genuine emotional distress claims independent of
an underlying tort, and in doing so, formulated different models of
recovery.
In 1968, California became a forerunner in molding the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress with the Dillon v. Legg4
decision. In Dillon, the California Supreme Court allowed a foresee-
able bystander to recover for the emotional distress suffered as a
result of negligent conduct directed at a third person.5 The court
defined the defendant's duty in a foreseeability model utilizing three
1. See generally W. KY-EON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §6, at 29 (5th ed. 1984)
(indicating that the first procedural writ that emerged in the thirteenth century was the action
of trespass, which was available for remedies that were purely tortious in character).
2. See Chamberlin v. Chandler, 3 F. Cas. 242 (1823) (No. 2,575) (holding the master of
a ship liable for a breach of an implied contract to be polite after he threatened to confine
the plaintiff passengers to their cabins). See also W. KEETON, supra note 1, §12, at 54-55
(noting that Chamberlin v. Chandler is the earliest appearance of anything resembling a
separate cause of action for mental suffering).
3. See W. KEETON, supra note 1, §12, at 56-57.
4. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
5. See id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
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factors to determine the plaintiff's proximity to the primary victim. 6
While a majority of jurisdictions have rejected the bystander prox-
imity theory of Dillon for fear of unlimited liability,7 California
courts have required strict adherence to the Dillon factors in order
to succeed on a negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of
action.
In 1980, the California Supreme Court created a second cause of
action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court's
decision in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals' characterized the
plaintiff as a "direct victim" of the defendant's negligent act, not-
withstanding the fact that the conduct involved a third person and
the plaintiff did not meet the Dillon factors of foreseeability. 9 The
court distinguished Dillon and treated the two cases as defining two
separate causes of action.10 Prior to Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psy-
chiatric Medical Clinic, Inc.," California courts were unwilling to
allow recovery in cases factually dissimilar to Dillon or Molien.1
2
In the recent decision of Marlene F., the California Supreme Court
afforded relief for- the emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff
whose child was sexually molested by a psychotherapist. 3 The plain-
tiff, who was neither a "proximate bystander" under the Dillon
approach nor a "direct victim" under the Molien approach, received
recognition for the breach of a limited duty owed to her arising out
of the professional relationship. 4
6. Id.
7. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969)
(predicting that the Dillon factors could not withstand a case-by-case analysis and that Dillon
would leave California without the means to limit the scope of liability in the bystander witness
cases).
8. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
9. Id. at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
10. Id.
11. 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 P.2d 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989).
12. See, e.g., Thing v. LaChusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 668, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30, 257 Cal.
Rptr. 865, 880-81 (1989) (denying recovery to a mother who, because she appeared on the
scene moments after her son was run over by a truck driven by the defendant, did not meet
the Dillon guidelines of proximity); Holiday v. Jones, 215 Cal. App. 3d 102, 111-12, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 448, 453 (1989) (denying relief for emotional distress claimed by children who witnessed
their father incarcerated for murder on the grounds that they could not be considered direct
victims under Molien standards); Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d
508, 522, 585 P.2d 851, 859, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1978) (denying recovery for emotional
distress suffered by the plaintiff mother, who came to see her son in the hospital after a
motorcycle accident, for not satisfying the Dillon guidelines of proximity to the accident).
13. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 P.2d
278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989).
14. Id. at 590, 770 P.2d at 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
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This Note examines the approach used by the California Supreme
Court in deciding that the negligent conduct of the defendant psy-
chotherapist in Marlene F. created a right of recovery by the plaintiff
mother. Part I discusses the evolution of the emotional distress torts
and the policy considerations contemplated in the recognition of the
torts as separate causes of action. 15 Part II will summarize the facts
of Marlene F. and review the majority and concurring opinions set
forth in that decision.16 Part III of this Note will discuss the possible
legal ramifications that the court's decision in Marlene F. will have
on future claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
7
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The emotional distress torts are currently in a dynamic state of
development.18 A little over sixty years ago our legal system did not
redress emotional distress injuries, which courts labeled as simple
annoyances and trivialities of life.' 9 Fearing fictitious and limitless
claims, courts were reluctant to afford tort protection for the inflic-
tion of emotional distress without an accompanying physical harm.
20
The underlying tort served as a peg upon which the "parasitic
damages" for mental distress could be awarded. 2'
15. See infra notes 18-132 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 133-164 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 165-199 and accompanying text.
18. See generally W. YETON, supra note 1, § 12, at 54-56 (observing the modern trends
taking place in the development of the emotional distress torts); Magruder, Mental and
Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033 (1936) (commenting on
the future development of the emotional distress torts).
19. See Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354, 354 (1896) (denying
recovery for injuries occasioned by fright when no immediate personal injury resulted from a
horse carriage stopping just short of the plaintiff); Spade v. Lynn & B. Ry. Co., 168 Mass.
285, 288, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897) (denying recovery for fright, terror, alarm, anxiety or distress
of mind if unaccompanied by some physical injury). See also Magruder, supra note 18, at
1035 (suggesting that, as against a large part of the frictions incident to community life, a
certain toughening of the mental hide was better protection than the law could ever be).
20. See Trogden v. Terry, 172 N.C. 540, 90 S.E. 583, 585 (1916) (awarding compensatory
damages for the humiliation and mental suffering, which resulted from a physical assault on
the plaintiff in a hotel dining room, when the defendant forced him to sign a note against his
will); Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W. 527, 528-30 (1884) (allowing recovery for the
emotional distress accompanying an action for battery when the defendant spit in the plaintiff's
face); Glasden General Hospital v. Hamilton, 212 Ala. 531, 103 So. 553, 554 (1925) (holding
damages are recoverable for nightmares suffered after the plaintiff's tortious detention in the
hospital for failure to pay her bill); Anthony v. Norton, 60 Kan. 341, 56 P. 529, 530 (1899)
(compensatory damages awarded for general family mortification and distress for the seduction
of their daughter).
21. See 1 STREET, FouNDATIONS OF LEGAL LLuanzrrv 460-70 (1906) (commenting that
treating any element of damages as parasitic was transitory in nature, and suggesting that
tomorrow such damages will be recognized as an independent basis of liability).
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Gradually, courts formulated models of recovery which protected
against fictitious and limitless claims, and the individual torts of
infliction of emotional distress emerged.2 Courts established the torts
of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
within each of these torts, a further classification was made which
recognized both mental distress inflicted directly upon a plaintiff and
mental distress resulting from conduct directed at a third person. A
closer look at the development of the emotional distress torts gen-
erally, and the latter classification in particular, will provide a basis
for understanding the legal ramifications of the California Supreme
Court's recent decision in Marlene F.
A. Policy Considerations for the Nonrecognition of Emotional
Distress Torts
Early common law did not recognize emotional distress as the
basis of liability in tort.3 Initially, this reluctance stemmed from the
belief that emotional distress was too subtle and speculative to be
capable of measurement.2 4 Furthermore, if courts did afford such
protection to peace of mind, it was believed that the judicial system
and society would be burdened with imaginary and trivial claims. 25
With modern advances in psychology, the difficulties with setting
22. Compare Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 241, 176 N.E. 2d 729, 731-32 (1969) (not
requiring physical injury or impact be shown in order to afford recovery) and Rodrigues v.
State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970) (Hawaii Supreme Court decision dropping the
presence requirement for emotional distress, but adopting a reasonable person standard) and
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d. 425, 433-34, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19
(1967) (Supreme Court of California rejecting the physical injury or impact requirement, but
requiring a showing of substantial damage) with Porter v. Delaware L. & W. Ry. Co., 73
N.J. 405, 63 A. 860, 860 (1906) (Supreme Court of New Jersey decision requiring that impact
be shown, but holding that dust in the eyes qualified as a physical impact).
23. See generally Victorian Ry. Comm'n v. Coultras, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888)
(denying relief for the plaintiff's fright suffered from a near miss of a passing train when
defendant caused plaintiff's car to become stuck in a railroad level crossing); Lynch v. Knight,
11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861) (denying recovery for mere fright when a run-away horse carriage
stopped inches away from the plaintiff's face); W. KEETON, supra note I, § 12 at 54-55;
Magruder, supra note 18, at 1035.
24. Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861) (announced that the law cannot value
mental pain or anxiety standing alone). See generally Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAn'.
L. Rav. 40 (1956) (tracing the developments in the emotional distress torts and the damages
associated with them).
25. See Victorian Ry. Comm'n v. Coultras, 13 App. Cas. 222, 226. See generally F.
HARPER & F. Jmas, Tit LAw OF TORTS § 18.4, at 1032 (1956); W. KEETON, supra note 1,
§54, at 329.
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damages and preventing so-called trivial claims have been largely
rejected as antiquated concepts.
2 6
In addition to the early difficulties of setting damages and pre-
venting trivial claims, the common law was also concerned with
discouraging fraudulent claims and limiting the defendant's liability.2 7
Courts reasoned that allowing recovery for emotional distress would
result in a flood of litigation in which the injury could easily be
feigned.2 Moreover, these courts reasoned, plaintiffs would allege
mental distress no matter how slight the injury.29 Barring all claims
based on mental distress alone, however, meant that many valid
claims would go unredressed.
In more recent decisions, the California Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that fraudulent assertions of emotional distress are rel-
atively isolated, and that a wholesale rejection of this entire class of
claims is not justified. 30 While the court seems willing to accept the
risk of fictitious suits, the fear of unlimited liability remains a core
concern. Having established legal protection for emotional distress
claims standing alone, a line must be drawn beyond which the
defendant is not liable, so that the liability of the defendant is not
unreasonable. The manner in which that line is drawn has shaped
our current understanding of the emotional distress torts.
26. See Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 933, 122 Cal. Rptr.
470, 481 (1975) (indicating that with the advances of modem psychological techniques, mental
trauma can be quantified and qualified just as easily as any physical paralysis). See also
Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MIcH. L. REv. 497, 513 (1922)
(analogizing emotional distress to other instances of non-pecuniary harm, such as in the case
of defamation, which the law already redresses with money damages).
27. See W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 12, at 56 (indicating that the most cogent objection
to the protection of mental interest lies in the wide door which might be opened not only to
fictitious claims, but to unlimited litigation in the "field of trivialities"); Comment, Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Horizons after Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,
13 PAC. L. J. 179, 182 (1981) (indicating that the considerations of fraudulent claims and
unlimited liability remain the strongest policy arguments against recovery for emotional distress
claims).
28. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354, 354 (1896) (denying
recovery for a miscarriage caused by the fright occasioned by defendant's negligence in stopping
a horse carriage inches from the plaintiff's face). The court announced the common law rule
that no recovery can be had for fright and its consequences. Id., 45 N.E. at 355.
29. Id., 45 N.E. at 355.
30. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 736, 441 P.2d 912, 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72, 77-78 (1968). Accord, Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 241, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1961) (granting relief to an infant plaintiff for the emotional distress suffered
on a ski lift when not properly fastened into the chair; stating that even if a flood of litigation
were realized, it is the duty of the courts to settle these disputes, thereby expressly overruling
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896)); W. KEETON, supra note 1,
§12, at 57; Magruder, supra note 18, at 1035.
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B. The First Recognized Mental Disturbance Tort: Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress
The earliest form of a separate cause of action for emotional
distress appeared in the common carrier context.3' While ordinary
defendants were not liable for what courts termed mere insult and
indignity, public utility defendants were deemed to be under a special
obligation to the public, and because of this obligation they opened
themselves to liability for grossly insulting their patrons.3 2 Once the
law began to move in this direction, however, courts were forced to
address concerns about fictitious claims and vexatious suits, which
had previously served to bar the existence of an independent tort for
mental distress .33 Because of the emphasis placed on these two policy
considerations, courts agreed that ordinary defendants would not be
held liable for mere insult, indignity, or annoyances.3 4
In special situations of extreme misconduct by an ordinary defen-
dant, however, courts allowed recovery. Courts were willing to afford
relief under the rationale that the gravity of the offense assured them
of the genuineness of the claim. 35 As a result, in 1930 the common
law recognized that the intentional infliction of mental distress by
extreme and outrageous conduct of any defendant constituted a cause
of action in itself.3
6
31. See Chamberlin v. Chandler, 3 F. Cas. 242 (1823) (No. 2,575).
32. See Cole v. Atlanta West Point Ry. Co., 102 Ga. 474, 31 S.E. 107, 108 (1897). The
court held a railroad liable for its conductor's abusive swearing at a passenger, which caused
the passenger humiliation and mortification. Id. The court reasoned that harm to a person's
feelings is as much actual damage as breaking the person's limbs. Id. See also Texas & Pacific
Railway Co. v. Jones, 39 S.W. 124, 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) (holding that a potential
railroad passenger may recover for mental suffering caused by the defendant's abusive language
while the plaintiff was purchasing her ticket); Emmke v. De Silva, 293 F. 17, 20-21 (8th Cir.
1923) (holding an innkeeper liable for mental distress and anxiety accompanying his entrance
into plaintiff's room and his accusations of unchastity, spoken in "loathsome terms of
vulgarity"). But cf. Jenkins v. Kentucky Hotel, Inc., 261 Ky. 419, 87 S.W. 2d 951 (1935)
(denying recovery to a plaintiff, who was only in the defendant's hotel lobby and not a
patron, after being insulted by a house detective); Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d
81 (D.C. 1946) (denying recovery to a plaintiff, who was not a patron but merely a customer
in a hotel bar, when he was insulted and embarrassed by a waiter).
33. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussing the policy considerations of
fictitious claims and unlimited liability).
34. See W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 12, at 59 (commenting on the transition of liability
from the common carrier context to that of the ordinary defendant).
35. See, e.g., Wikinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B.D. 57 (Eng. 1897) (holding a practical joker
liable for the serious distress caused by telling a women that her husband had been injured in
an accident and that she should go to his aid).
36. See Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAMin. L. REv. 40 (1956) (commenting during the
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The seminal California Supreme Court decision describing the
independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is State
Rubbish Collector's Association v. Siliznoff. 3 7 In Siliznoff, the court
awarded relief to a defendant suffering emotional distress as a
consequence of the plaintiff's extreme and outrageous behavior.
3
1
The plaintiff, Rubbish Association, brought suit to collect on a
promissory note signed by the defendant, Siliznoff.39 Siliznoff counter-
claimed for mental distress damages resulting from the threats the
plaintiff used in extracting the note from the defendant. 40 The court
concluded that the defendant had signed the note under duress, which
the plaintiff was substantially certain would produce fear in the
defendant. 41 Hence, it was clear that the rubbish association caused
Silzinoff to suffer emotional distress, and liability would therefore
attach.42 The supreme court defined the cause of action as intention-
ally subjecting another to mental suffering incident to serious threats
of physical well-being, whether or not these threats are made under
such circumstances as to constitute the separate tort of assault.
43
Modernly, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
has become firmly embedded in California law. 44 In the 1979 decision
of Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co.,45 the California Supreme Court
development of the Second Restatement of Torts that the time had come to define liability
for insult and outrage standing alone); W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 12, at 59-61. In recognition
of this development, the American Law Institute amended section 46 of the Restatement of
Torts in 1947 to provide a cause of action against one who causes severe emotional distress
to another. REsTATEmENT (SEcoz'D) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
37. 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
38. Id. at 335, 240 P.2d at 285.
39. Id. at 333-36, 240 P.2d at 283-84.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 339, 240 P.2d at 286.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 336, 240 P.2d at 284-85.
44. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 496-98, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 89-
91, 468 P.2d 216, 217-19 (1970) (awarding damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress to an African-American employee who was verbally assaulted as to his conduct on the
job, as well as his race); Vargas V. Ruggiero, 197 Cal. App. 2d 709, 717-18, 17 Cal. Rptr.
568, 569-78 (1961) (allowing plaintiff recovery for the severe shock and subsequent miscarriage
resulting from the defendant driving onto the plaintiff's yard, entering her house, and
threatening to harm her); Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal. App. 2d. 124, 130, 217 P.2d 113,
117-18 (1950) (plaintiff was awarded damages after being forced out of her apartment and
forced to retrieve her own belongings, which caused emotional trauma and a subsequent
miscarriage); Bowden v. Speigel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 794-95, 216 P.2d 571, 572-73
(1950) (plaintiff awarded mental distress damages when the defendant company called the
plaintiff demanding her presence as some sort of emergency, when in actuality the defendant
company simply desired payment of her bill); Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App. 2d 313, 316-19,
198 P.2d 696, 697-700 (1948) (defendant held liable for the illness caused to the plaintiff by
re-letting her apartment without notice).
45. 24 Cal. 3d 579, 595 P.2d 975, 156 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1979) (holding that a plaintiff
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delineated the elements of the prima facie case, which are: "(1)
extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention
of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emo-
tional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme distress;
and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by
the defendant's outrageous conduct. ' 46 Moreover, California courts
are willing to award damages for emotional distress without any
additional requirement of physical injury.47 Under the California
approach, the defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct serves to
assure the court of the genuineness of the claim. 48 While the gravity
of the defendant's conduct serves to assure the validity of the
plaintiff's claim when the conduct is directed at the plaintiff, a
different set of assurances are necessary when the plaintiff suffers
emotional distress due to conduct not directed toward the plaintiff,
but toward a third party.
1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Resulting From
Conduct Directed at a Third Person
When mental distress has been inflicted upon the plaintiff by
conduct not directed at the plaintiff himself, a number of problems
arise. As with all intentional torts, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant was substantially certain that the plaintiff would be
harmed. 49 In most instances of mental distress suffered by a third
could recover for mental distress because of her abrupt and unwarranted arrest by a plainclothes
security guard in the defendant's store).
46. Id. at 593, 595 P.2d at 983, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
47. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collector's Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 337-38, 240
P.2d 282, 285-86 (1952) (awarding mental distress damages without any physical pain or
suffering); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498, 468 P.2d 216, 218, 86 Cal. Rptr.
88, 90 (1970) (plaintiff suffered only humiliation and mental anguish from the verbal con-
frontation by his supervisor); Comblith v. First Maintenance Supply Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d
564, 565, 74 Cal. Rptr. 216, 217 (1968) (denying mental distress damages to a plaintiff sales
person who suffered only humiliation when the defendant conspired with plaintiff's co-workers).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (rejecting any absolute necessity for
physical harm accompanying a mental distress claim).
48. See generally W. KEEToN, supra note 1, § 12, at 61-63 (defining extreme and outrageous
conduct as conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by . decent society, which may
result from prolonged or repeated hounding, abuse of the defendant's position of trust, or
the defendant's knowledge and abuse of the plaintiff's special sensitivities).
49. See Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091, 1094-95 (1955) (a showing
that the defendant intended to act was held insufficient to impose liability, but if the defendant
knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would be harmed, then the defendant would
be liable for the intentional tort of battery).
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party plaintiff, the intent to harm the plaintiff is difficult to prove.50
However, when a high degree of probability exists that the plaintiff's
mental disturbance is a predictable and logical outcome of the
defendant's conduct, courts have been willing to afford relief.51 Much
like the "extreme and outrageous" element required in the two party
context, courts have reasoned in the third party context that the
intent element may be shown by the defendant's conscious and
deliberate disregard of the potential for harm.
The limits on recovery in the third party context have been ac-
knowledged by the American Law Institute (ALI). The ALI's current
formulation of these limits appear in section 46(2) of the Restatement
of Torts, which limits recovery to two situations: (1) where the
mental distress is suffered by a member of the victim's immediate
family and that family member is present at the time of the defen-
dant's tortious act; 52 or (2) where the mental distress is suffered by
a person present at the time of the defendant's action and the mental
distress manifests itself in bodily harm." In both situations, the
drafters of the Restatement chose to limit relief exclusively to plain-
50. See Konnitz v. Keller, 52 Ohio App. 265, 3 N.E.2d 694, 697 (1936) (denying recovery
to a jplaintiff who came upon her murdered sister's body after the defendant assaulted the
sister on the plaintiff's property); Renner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 90, 30 N.W. 435, 436 (1886)
(denying recovery because the plaintiff's presence was unknown to the defendant when the
defendant shot the plaintiff's dog on the plaintiff's property). One possible way of proving
the intent element is with the doctrine of transferred intent, as used in Talmage v. Smith,
(holding the defendant was held liable for battery when he threw a stick in an attempt to hit
one of two other boys on his roof) 101 Mich. 370, 59 N.W. 656, 657 (1894). As commentators
have observed, however, the emotional distress cause of action did not originate from the old
action of trespass, and thus the doctrine of transferred intent has been interpreted to be
inapplicable. See W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 12, at 65. See also Taylor v. Vallelunga, 171
Cal. App. 2d 107, 109, 339 P.2d 910, 911 (1959) (holding that where the plaintiff's presence
was unknown to the defendant, no intent to harm could be found and the defendant was not
liable for the resulting distress). But cf. Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W.Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244
(1924) (holding that a pregnant plaintiff, whose presence was unknown to the defendant, can
recover for emotional distress suffered from viewing her father being attacked).
51. See Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890) (plaintiff allowed to recover
when the defendant inflicted battery upon another in the presence of the pregnant plaintiff,
who suffered a miscarriage as a result of the mental disturbance); Rogers v. Williard, 144
Ark. 587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920) (quarrel in presence of pregnant woman led to emotional distress
recovery); Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 429, 430-31 (1916) (holding that a plaintiff
could recover for emotional distress damages when the defendant came into her house, pointed
a gun at plaintiff's husband, and threatened to kill him); Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174
N.E.2d 157 (1961) (holding that the murder of the plaintiff's husband in her presence created
liability for the accompanying emotional distress); Young v. Western & Atlantic Ry. Co., 39
Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E. 414 (1929) (holding defendant liable for plaintiff's emotional distress
resulting from the defendant's entering of her home and dragging her husband out of bed at
gun point).
52. RE sTATE MNT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 46(2)(a) (1965).
53. Id. §46(2)(b).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 22
.tiffs who are present at the time of the defendant's tortious act.
As the comments to the Restatement indicate, the limitation of the
presence element grew out of the practical need to guarantee the
genuineness of the plaintiff's claim.5 4 Furthermore, the comments
emphasize that the plaintiff's presence must be known by the defen-
dant before liability can attach." The Restatement, however, is not
absolute. In a caveat to section 46, the commentators leave open the
possibility of recovery in other situations .
6
In a 1982 decision, Delia S. v. Torres,57 the Second District Court
of Appeals allowed a husband, who was outside the country at the
time of the defendant's Act, to recover for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress resulting from the rape of his wife by his
friend.58 The court balanced the husband's absence with the profound
and extreme emotional consequences which can be reasonably inferred
from the rape of one's wife.5 9 The court's analysis focused on the
plaintiff's relationship to the subject of the act, and held that the
effect of the transgression gave rise to a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.60 While courts have been slow to
dispense with the presence requirement, there have been recent Cal-
ifornia decisions that place the continuing viability of the requirement
in doubt.6
1
C. The Development of the Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress Tort
The reluctance to redress emotional distress, as previously dis-
cussed, is even more pronounced when the defendant's conduct is
54. Id. at §46 comment I (demonstrating the use of the presence requirement as a limitation
on claims in the situation where the number of persons who may suffer emotional distress at
the news of an assassination of the president is virtually unlimited).
55. Id. See, e.g., Taylor v. Vallelunga, 171 Cal. App. 2d 107, 109, 339 P.2d 910, 911-12
(1959) (court denied relief to a daughter who witnessed the beating of her father for failure
to plead that the defendant knew that the plaintiff was a witness to the battery).
56. REsTATEmmNT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs §46 comment 1, at 79 (1965).
57. 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1982).
58. Id. at 483, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 794-95.
59. Id. at 484, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583,
594-95, 770 P.2d 278, 285, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98, 105 (1989) (Arguelles, J., concurring) (interpreting
the caveat to section 46 as an invitation to drop the presence requirement); Vescovo v. New
Way Enterprises Ltd., 60 Cal. App. 3d 582, 585-88, 130 Cal. Rptr. 86, 87-90 (1976) (holding
that a 14 year old daughter, who was not privy to the defendant's act, could recover for the
defendant's act of printing of the plaintiff's mother's address in a lewd advertisement, causing
100 persons to enter her property using abusive and threatening language).
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merely negligent. In the beginning, the common law courts took the
position that imposing liability on a negligent defendant for emotional
distress would subject the defendant to unlimited liability for fictitious
claims. 62 However, when emotional distress resulted directly from, or
manifested itself in, physical injury, the number of actionable claims
became limited and many courts felt assured as to the claim's validity.
Thus, in some jurisdictions the common law cause of action for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress arose, allowing damages
when physical impact or injury could be shown to result from the
defendant's negligent behavior. 63 However, jurisdictions have been
far from uniform in their application of this evolving common law
cause of action.64 In certain exceptional situations, when the circum-
stances themselves ensure that the emotional distress was not feigned,
there has been a tendency to break away from the evolving rule and
allow recovery for mental disturbance without impact or injury. 65
Viewed as a jurisprudential conflict, the impact or injury require-
ment denied access to a legal remedy for plaintiffs who suffered
from genuine emotional distress as a witness of the defendant's
conduct. 6 That conflict is a departure from the fundamental principle
of justice that for every wrong there is a remedy. 67 In Crisci v.
Security Insurance Co. ,68 the California Supreme Court expressly
rejected the strict application of the common law impact or injury
requirement. 69 In Crisci, the plaintiff claimed damages for emotional
62. See Magruder, supra note 18, at 1036. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs §
436A comment b (1965).
63. See W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 54, at 362-64; Magruder, supra note 18, at 1049.
64. See, e.g., Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931) (allowing the act
of fainting after a car collision to satisfy the impact requirement); Kentucky Traction & Term.
Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1929) (affording relief to a plaintiff
only after the showing of a minor burn); Porter v. Delaware L. & W. Ry. Co., 73 N.J. 405,
63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in the eyes qualifying as impact); Morton v. Stock, 122 Ohio St. 115,
170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation of smoke satisfying the impact requirement); Christy Bros.
Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928) (finding impact where the defendant's
horse defacated into the plaintiff's lap).
65. In cases of negligent transmission of telegrams carrying messages of death, courts
have been willing to afford recovery for emotional distress. See Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d
378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975); Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C.
504, 23 S.E.2d 681, 683-84 (1943). In cases where the plaintiff has suffered emotional distress
resulting from the mishandling of corpses, courts have been willing to afford relief without
requiring impact of injury. See, e.g., Chisum v. Behrens, 283 N.W.2d 235 (S.D. 1979).
66. See Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 932-36, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 470, 480-83 (1975) (tracking the California case law on the negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
67. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433, 426 P.2d 173, 178, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 18 (1967).
68. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
69. Id. at 433-34, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
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distress associated with the loss of her property and a personal
judgment against her which the defendant insurance company was
contractually obligated, but refused, to assume. 70 The court reasoned
that when an actionable claim has resulted in "substantial damage"
apart from emotional distress, the policy considerations supporting
the physical impact requirement are greatly reduced. 7' While the
significance of this decision is in the court's removal of the impact
or injury requirement, the Crisci court did not attempt to define the
new substantial damage requirement.
In 1975, the substantial damage requirement was clarified in Jarchow
v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co.7 2 In Jarchow, the Fourth District
Court of Appeals announced that any interference with one's legally
protected interests would be sufficient to satisfy the substantial damage
requirement.73 Moreover, the substantial damage need not be compen-
sable, since that would add little to any guarantee of genuineness
provided by the substantial damage requirement.74 In dicta, the Jarchow
court noted that the California Supreme Court had yet to permit
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress when mental
injury was the only damage, but that endorsement of such action
seemed to be the logical end product of the current decisional trend.
75
Hawaii was the first state to protect the interest in freedom from
emotional distress, independent of any physical injury or substantial
damage requirement.76 Rodrigues v. State,77 decided by the Hawaii
Supreme Court in 1970, held that a plaintiff was entitled to an
independent recovery for emotional harm caused by a defendant's
negligence, without having to prove physical impact or substantial
damage.7 8 It can no longer be said, the court declared, that the
advantages gained by courts administering claims of mental distress by
using the narrow categories of physical impact or substantial damage
70. Id. at 427-29, 426 P.2d at 175-76, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16.
71. Id. at 433-34, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19. Crisci suffered $91,000 in financial
injury when the defendant insurer failed to accept a reasonable settlement from plaintiff's
tenant. Id. The court found this substantial injury justified an accompanying award of $25,000
for emotional distress. Id. Accord Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 580, 510 P.2d
1032, 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 490 (1973) (awarding the plaintiff emotional distress damages
when the defendant insurance company's representative accused the plaintiff of setting fire to
his own bar, resulting in substantial economic loss).
72. 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975).
73. Id. at 937, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 483-84.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 937 n.11, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 484 n.ll.
76. See W. KEEToN, supra note 1, § 54, at 364.
77. 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
78. Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520.
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outweigh the accompanying burden placed on the injured plaintiff.79
Applying general tort principles requiring the defendant to act as a
reasonably prudent person toward those who may foreseeably be
endangered by the defendant's conduct, the court awarded the plaintiff
damages for a breach of the defendant's duty that caused "serious"
mental distress to the plaintiff.8° California would eventually adopt this
approach under the direct victim theory, where the plaintiff's emotional
distress is a result of the defendant's conduct directed at another. 81
1. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Resulting From
Conduct Directed at a Third Person
It is one thing to say that as to those who are put in peril of physical
impact or injury, no impact is required to sustain an action for
emotional distress. It is quite another thing to say that those who are
out of the field of physical danger should have a protected right to be
free from emotional distress occasioned by the peril of others. In the
early case of Waube v. Warrington,u the Wisconsin Supreme Court
acknowledged that American law did not protect the right to be free
from emotional distress occasioned by harm to third parties.8 In
Waube, the plaintiff claimed emotional distress damages as a proximate
result of the defendant's negligent driving, which killed the plaintiff's
daughter8 4 The court denied recovery at that time, deciding that such
an interest is not within the field of legally protected rights.
85
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that awarding damages to
a mere bystander based solely on causation could potentially lead to
the imposition of liability against a defendant who did not owe the
plaintiff a legally recognizable duty. 6 The court explained that while
the plaintiff's emotional distress may have been proximately caused by
79. Id.
80. Id. at 174-75, 472 P.2d at 521.
81. See Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980). See also infra notes 113-128 and accompanying text (delineating the elements
of a cause of action under the direct victim theory of Molien). Missouri, Ohio, Alabama,
Louisiana, and Connecticut are among a handful of courts that have permitted a general
negligence cause of action for the infliction of serious emotional distress without regard to
physical injury. W. KEETON, supra note 1, §54 at 364-65 n. 59.
82. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
83. Id. at 612, 258 N.W. at 501.
84. Id. at 603-04, 258 N.W. at 497.
85. Id. at 614-15, 258 N.W. at 501.
86. Id. at 612-14, 258 N.W. at 500.
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the defendant's negligence,8 the defendant could not have reasonably
anticipated any harm to the plaintiff, and therefore, owed her no duty
of care.88 The court concluded that extending the defendant's duty of
care to those who are out of the field of physical danger was both
illogical and beyond any social interest.8 9 Furthermore, the court rea-
soned that imposing liability would put an unreasonable burden on
society and open the door to fraudulent claims.90
The concerns announced in Waube are familiar ones. They are part
of a re-occurring theme that has hindered the evolution of the emotional
distress causes of action from the very beginning. 9' As before, when
the genuineness of the claim could be assured by imposing restrictions,
courts eventually extended liability. In the third party context, a mi-
nority of jurisdictions have done so by simply embracing the physical
injury or impact requirement from the two party context, when the
defendant has directed his conduct directly at the plaintiff.92 While
awarding emotional distress damages to injured plaintiffs, these juris-
dictions deny recovery to a plaintiff witness who was not physically
injured by the defendant's negligence. 93 However, a majority of courts
recognize that a genuine distress claim can exist in an uninjured
bystander situation, and therefore have adopted the zone of danger
approach. 94
In Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. ,9 the California Supreme
Court had adopted the zone of danger standard. The court stated that
87. Id. (citing as incorrectly decided, Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers, 1 K.B. 141 (1925),
holding the defendant liable for the emotional distress proximately caused the plaintiff, when
his truck ran downhill injuring the plaintiffs daughter).
88. Id. at 605-06, 258 N.W. at 501 (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339,
162 N.E. 99 (1928) (duty of a defendant in a negligence action to a plaintiff is not absolute
and shall be limited).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text (describing the policy consideration of
the past, which barred relief in claims for emotional distress).
92. Ohio, Tennessee, Missouri, Florida, Kentucky, and Georgia have retained the impact
rule in this area. Liebson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical
Injury to Another, 15 J. FAm. L. 163, 168-72 (1977). See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying
text (discussing the physical impact or injury requirement).
93. See, e.g., Selfe v. Smith, 397 So. 2d 348, 349-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (denying
emotional distress damages to a plaintiff passenger in a car collision because the impact rule
requires the plaintiff to sustain some physical injury); Carlinville National Bank v. Rhoads,
63 IUl. App. 3d 502, 380 N.E.2d 63 (1978) (widow denied recovery for emotional distress
sustained in witnessing the instantaneous death of her husband when struck by the defendant's
car in a head-on collision).
94. See, e.g., Delosovic v. City of New York, 143 Misc. 2d 801, 541 N.Y.S.2d 685 (N.Y.
Sup. 1989) (allowing plaintiff mother to recover for her emotional distress, having been within
the zone of danger when her two sons were struck by a truck while crossing a street).
95. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
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if the plaintiff was within such a close range to the accident that only
a "near-miss" situation would avoid physical impact, then a duty of
care would be established. 96 While the plaintiff would no longer have
to show physical impact, the test required proof that the emotional
distress caused some physical injury.97 In Amaya, the court denied
recovery to a physically uninjured mother for emotional distress, when
she witnessed a truck run over her seventeen-month-old child.98 The
court concluded that its decision made good sense given the fact that
Mrs. Amaya could not have feared for her own safety given her
distance from the impact. 99
One of the criticisms of the zone of danger test is that it often leads
to anomalous results by not redressing genuine claims of distress. 1' In
an attempt to harmonize genuine claims of mental distress with limited
liability for the defendant, the California Supreme Court expressly
overruled Amaya and developed two diverging theories of recovery,
affording relief to innocent plaintiffs located outside of the zone of
danger under the bystander proximity theory of Dillon v. Legg,101 or
the direct victim theory of Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals.1 2
a. Dillon v. Legg: The Bystander Proximity Theory
In Dillon v. Legg, a mother was lawfully crossing the street with
her infant and daughter walking in front of her when the defendant,
who was driving his car, negligently collided with the infant.03 The
trial court applied the zone of danger test and allowed recovery for
the mental distress suffered by the daughter, who was located so close
to the infant that she was in fear of her own safety. 4 However, the
court denied recovery to the mother, who was just a few feet behind
96. Id. at 302-03, 379 P.2d at 517, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 39. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 436 comment f (1965) (embracing the zone of danger standard).
97. See Amaya, 59 Cal. 2d at 302-03, 379 P.2d at 517, 29 Cal. Rptr. -at 39. See also
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) (embracing the zone of danger approach to
the negligent infliction of emotional distress).
98. Amaya, 59 Cal. 2d at 298-302, 379 P.2d at 514-16, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 34-36.
99. Id. at 304-06, 379 P.2d at 518-19, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 38-39.
100. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 748, 441 P.2d 912, 925, 69 Cal. Rptr.72,
85 (1968) (overruling Amaya, and formulating a new model of recovery).
101. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). See infra notes 103-112 and
accompanying text (discussing the bystander proximity model delineated in Dillon).
102. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). See infra notes 113-128 and
accompanying text (discussing the direct victim model announced in Molien).
103. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
104. Id.
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the infant, explaining that the mother was not in the zone of danger. 05
The appellate court affirmed, but the California Supreme Court re-
versed, granting the mother relief for the mental distress which resulted
in physical injury. 106 The court rejected the zone of danger test as an
arbitrary determinant of duty, and appeared to return to the concept
of foreseeability as determinative of the defendant's duty.0 7
The Dillon court announced that foreseeability would be narrowed
by three factors: (1) physical proximity; (2) temporal proximity; and
(3) relational proximity.les The three factors require a court to look
beyond the plaintiff's physical nearness to the accident. For instance,
the temporal proximity factor requires the court to examine the manner
and time period in which the plaintiff learned of the injury to the
primary victim. 109 Moreover, the relational proximity factor was de-
signed as a means by which a court would take into account the
likelihood of emotional harm when the victim is a close relative of the
plaintiff.11
0
Many states have chosen not to adopt the California approach
outlined in Dillon for fear of unlimited liability, and have instead
adopted various modifications of the Dillon approach."' However,
105. Id. at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
106. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
107. See id. at 747, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85. But see Green, Foreseeability in
Negligence Law, 61 CoLUm. L. Rav. 1401, 1420-24 (1961) (looking for a proper formula for
determining liability in negligence cases, Professor Green cautions against the use of the "all
purpose" foreseeability formula); Green, The Wagon Mound No. 2-Foreseeability Revisited,
1967 UTAH L. REv. 197 (suggesting that foreseeability is being overloaded, and that many
foreseeable risks do not fall within the scope of any duty owed to the plaintiff); Adams,
Proximate Cause is Too Remote, 17 S.D.L. REv. 316 (1972) (dismissing foreseeability as
determinative and suggesting five factors better used in deciding the extent of the negligent
defendant's obligation; the administrative, ethical or moral, economic, preventative, and
judicial).
108. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
109. See Annotation, Immediacy of Observation of Injury as Affecting Right to Recover
Damages for Shock or Mental Anguish from Witnessing Injury to Another, 5 A.L.R. 4th 833
(Supp. 1989) (distinguishing the California cases satisfying the Dillon temporal factor where
the plaintiff is present at the scene when the injury occurred as opposed to arriving afterwards).
110. See Annotation, Relationship Between Victim and Plaintiff-Witness as Affecting Right
to Recover Damages in Negligence for Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Victim's Injury
or Death, 94 A.L.R. 3d 486 (Supp. 1989) (analyzing those California cases satisfying the
Dillon relational factor as determined by the relationship between the plaintiff and the third
party injured by the defendant's tortious act).
111. See, e.g., D'Ambra v. U.S., 354 F. Supp. 810, 820 (D.R.I. 1973) (Rhode Island
adding a fourth factor to the Dillon test-foreseeability of the plaintiff's presence); Leong v.
Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 403-10, 520 P.2d 758, 763-66 (1974) (Hawaii loosely adopting the
Dillon factors and rejecting any physical injury requirement); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d
609, 618-19, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 560-61 (1969) (New York refusing to allow
recovery for emotional distress to all percipient plaintiff witnesses); Stadler v. Cross, 295
N.W.2d 552, 554-55 (Minn. 1980) (Minnesota retaining the zone of danger test).
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Dillon pointed out that strict compliance with its guidelines would serve
to limit liability, while redressing genuine claims.112 In Thing v. La-
Chusa,"3 the California Supreme Court demanded strict compliance
with the Dillon guidelines, and refused to allow even the slightest
deviation.
1 1 4
b. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: The Direct Victim
Theory
In 1980, the California Supreme Court created a major inroad to
the lone theory of bystander witness relief for the negligent infliction
of emotional distress created by Dillon. In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals,"5 the plaintiff was not within the bystander witness classi-
fication of the Dillon factors, when the plaintiff's wife's physician
misdiagnosed the plaintiff's wife as having contracted syphilis.1 16 The
defendant physician advised the plaintiff's wife to inform her husband
of the diagnosis, so that he could come in for the necessary blood
tests.17 Because of the nature of this sexually transmitted disease, Mrs.
Molien suspected the plaintiff of extramarital sexual activities, which
led to marital discord and eventually divorce proceedings." 8 Mr. Molien
brought an action against the hospital and the doctor for negligent
infliction of emotional distress." 9 The trial court dismissed on the
ground that the action failed to meet the Dillon test of foreseeability,
and the appellate court affirmed. 2°
The California Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that Mr.
Molien was a direct victim of the defendant's negligence because the
112. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
113. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
114. Id. at 668-69, 771 P.2d at 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881. The court denied recovery
to a plaintiff mother who appeared on the scene moments after her son was run over by a
truck driven by the defendant. Id. The court focused on the undisputed fact that the plaintiff
was neither present at the time of the accident, nor was she aware that her son was being
injured. Id. See also Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 522, 585
P.2d 851, 859, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1978) (denying recovery for emotional distress suffered by
the plaintiff mother in viewing her 10-year-old child in the hospital on the grounds that she
lacked physical proximity to the child when he was struck by a motorcycle); Wynne v. Orcutt
Union School Dist., 17 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1111, 195 Cal. Rptr. 458, 459 (1971) (denying
emotional distress damages to a mother, after the defendant negligently informed her son of
his fatal disease, because the facts did not fit the mold of Dillon foreseeability).
115. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
116. Id. at 919-20, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 918-21, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
120. Id.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 22
defendant either assumed a duty when he told the plaintiff's wife to
tell her husband of his diagnosis or had a duty imposed by law to
warn the plaintiff of his diagnosis. 121 While Mr. Molien clearly did not
satisfy the first two Dillon criteria requiring physical and temporal
proximity, the court announced that a rote application of such guide-
lines to a case factually dissimilar to Dillon is unwarranted.'2 In this
manner, Dillon was not overruled, but limited to a case in which the
plaintiff seeks recovery for damages sustained as a bystander witnessing
the injury of a third person. In cases such as Molien, a court is required
to analyze all the circumstances on a case by case basis to decide
liability.
In Molien, the court noted that the significance of Dillon was not
in its delineation of factors, but rather in its adoption of the general
principle of foreseeability.lu While the Dillon court sought to limit the
foreseeability principle by applying three factors, the court in Molien
took no such step. Instead, the Molien court reasoned in terms of the
probability and predictability that certain negligent conduct would cause
emotional distress to the plaintiff.1 Rationalizing that both Mr. and
Mrs. Molien would experience "anticipation" as a result of the defen-
dant's diagnosis, Mr. Molien was characterized as a reasonably fore-
seeable victim of the defendant's negligence.2 5 Therefore, the defendant
should have known that his negligence would cause his patient's
husband emotional distress. 1
The negligent examination of Mrs. Molien, and the conduct of
directing that her husband be informed, were objectively verifiable
actions that served as a measure of the validity of the plaintiff's
claim. 127 However, the court also implied, by citing to the case of
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,1u that even if the
doctor did not voluntarily assume a duty by telling the wife to inform
her husband, a duty may have been implied by law. 29 In Tarasoff,
the California Supreme Court had previously established a legally
121. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (limiting foreseeability with three
proximity factors).
124. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
125. Id. at 920, 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
126. Id. Accord Marlene F. v. Psychiatric Med. Clinic, 48 Cal. 3d 583, 590 n.5, 770 P.2d
278, 282 n.5, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98, 102 n.5 (1989) (indicating that the liability in Molen may
have rested on a duty of the defendant imposed by law).
127. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
128. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
129. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
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recognizable duty of a psychologist defendant to warn identifiable third
parties of dangers posed by other patients. 130 The supreme court did
not identify the basis of the duty in Molien, stating only that the
plaintiff was a direct victim. 131 Unfortunately, the court did not provide
any future guidance as to the application of the direct victim theory




In 1980, Marlene F., the plaintiff, engaged the services of the
Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic (Clinic) to obtain counseling for
family emotional problems that existed between her and her son. 33 The
Clinic assigned the plaintiff's son to a psychologist, the defendant,
who began treating both the plaintiff and her son. 134 After two years
of treatment, the plaintiff discovered that her son had been sexually
molested by the defendant during individual therapy sessions. 13 The
plaintiff confronted the Clinic with this discovery and, although the
Clinic subsequently denied any wrongdoing, the Clinic removed the
defendant therapist from the case.13 6 Consequently, the plaintiff brought
suit against the Clinic and the therapist for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress, alleging that the molestation caused her serious
mental distress.137
130. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 438-42, 551 P.2d at 345-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25-27.
131. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
132. Prior to Marlene F., California courts denied recovery unless the parent was a
bystander witness to his child's accidental harm. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564,
565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977) (expectant father denied recovery for emotional distress
when he was asked to leave the delivery room prior to the defendant's negligent act that
resulted in a stillbirth); Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr.
639 (1975) (denying recovery by parents who only saw the permanent injuries of blindness,
brain damage, quadriplegia, and grand mal seizures resulting from defendant's negligent oral
surgery); Jansen v. Children's Hospital Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr.
883 (1973) (court refused recovery to a mother who witnessed the slow death of her child
when the hospital negligently discharged its obligation to diagnose and treat her daughter).
133. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 585-86, 770
P.2d 278, 279, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98, 99 (1989). Two other mothers who had taken their sons to
the Clinic for counseling joined as plaintiffs. Id.
134. Id. All three children were assigned to the same defendant psychologist. Id.
135. Id. The other two boys had also been molested. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. 588, 770 P.2d at 280-81 n.3, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 100-01 n.3. While the mother of
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At the trial court level, the defendants successfully demurred to the
emotional distress cause of action.' On appeal, the court of appeals
affirmed on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim
under either the bystander proximity theory of Dillon or the direct
victim theory of Molien.139 The California Supreme Court, however,
reversed and afforded relief to the plaintiff for emotional distress by
expanding the direct victim theory announced in Molien to include a
parent/child relationship. 40
B. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion written by Justice Arguelles, 14 1 the court first discussed
the applicability of the bystander proximity theory of Dillon to the
current case. The majority explained that the Dillon approach was only
applicable to define a duty of care when the plaintiff sought to recover
emotional distress damages suffered as a percipient witness. 42 Because
the mother was not a percipient witness of the defendant's conduct,
the plaintiff was not allowed recovery under the Dillon theory. 143
The court then discussed the applicability of the direct victim theory
of Molien. The court recognized that the direct victim theory was not
based solely on foreseeability, but rather upon the breach of a duty
owed to the plaintiff. 44 Moreover, the court explained that a duty may
be either assumed voluntarily, imposed on the defendant as a matter
of law, or arise from a relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant. 4
the third child did not assert an emotional distress claim for herself, all three mothers brought
suit on behalf of their children against the therapist and the Clinic for battery, negligence,
and professional malpractice. Id.
138. Id. at 587, 770 P.2d at 280, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
139. Id. The plaintiff did not have any contemporaneous sensory perception, nor physical
proximity to the victim when the defendant molested her son, and therefore failed to meet
the Dillon factors. Id. Moreover, the court of appeals did not view the molestation as an act
directed at the mothers in such a way that they became reasonably foreseeable victims under
the Molien approach. Id. See supra notes 103-128 and accompanying text (discussing both the
Dillon and Molien models of recovery).
140. Id. 590, 770 P.2d at 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
141. Id. at 585-92, 770 P.2d at 278-83, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 98-103. Justice Arguelles is a
retired Associate Justice sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
Id. The opinion was joined by Justices Mosk, Broussard, and Kaufman. Id.
142. Id. at 589, 770 P.2d at 281, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 101. See supra notes 103-12 and
accompanying text (defining the Dillon bystander model of recovery).
143. Marlene F., 48 Cal. 3d at 590-91, 770 P.2d at 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
144. Id. at 590-91, 770 P.2d at 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. 102.
145. Id.
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In Marlene F., the plaintiff, as well as the child, were patients of
the defendant. When the defendant undertook to treat both the plaintiff
and her son for the discord between them, a duty to the plaintiff was
established by the creation of a therapeutic relationship. 1' Furthermore,
counseling was directed not at the plaintiff and son individually, but
within the context of the family unit. 47 The court concluded that in
these circumstances a professional psychologist should have known that
his sexual molestation of the son would cause severe emotional distress
to his mother.' 4 The court ultimately held that the molestation of the
son breached the therapist's duty of care to the plaintiff. 49
C. Concurrence by Justice Arguelles
In addition to the majority opinion, Justice Arguelles wrote separately
to suggest that liability should be imposed for the intentional, as
opposed to negligent, infliction of emotional distress.Y0 This suggested
basis of liability arose from finding that the plaintiff's complaint alleges
the essential elements of severe mental disturbance caused by the
extreme and outrageous conduct of the therapist, which was undertaken
with reckless disregard of causing such distress to the plaintiff.'
5'
Recognizing that the conduct of the defendant was not directed at the
plaintiff, but rather at the son, Justice Arguelles turned to the Res-
tatement's formulation of the intentional infliction of emotional distress





149. Id. at 592, 770 P.2d at 283, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
150. Id. at 598, 770 P.2d at 288, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 108 (Arguelles, J., concurring). This
concurring opinion was joined by Justice Mosk, who wrote the majority opinion in Molien.
Id. See Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980). In California, the court is not limited to the plaintiff's theory of recovery in
testing the sufficiency of the complaint against a demurrer; consequently Justice Arguelles
articulates a second theory on which the plaintiff may succeed, but which was not as widely
accepted as the majority opinion indicates. See 4 WrnuN, CAL. PROCEDURE, PLEADING § 367
at 420-21 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989) (indicating that California has rejected the doctrinal
theory of the pleading as incompatible with the long departed notion of holding the plaintiff
strictly to the form of action). As a result, courts are not limited to plaintiff's theory of
recovery in testing the sufficiency of the complaint against a demurrer, but instead must
determine if the factual allegations of the complaint are adequate to state a cause of action
under any legal theory. Id.
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Justice Arguelles noted that section 46(2) of the Restatement requires
that the potential plaintiff be present at the time the defendant en-
counters the third party, as a means of verifying the authenticity of
the plaintiff's claim.1 3 Recognizing that the plaintiff in Marlene F. was
not present at the time of the molestation, Justice Arguelles advocated
dropping the presence requirement when, as here, the extreme and
outrageous conduct arises from an abuse of a position of authority.
5 4
Justice Arguelles reasoned that when abuse of such authority arises in
a relationship of trust, the outrageousness of the conduct is com-
pounded, and the presence requirement is no longer necessary to limit
the universe of potential claimants.'55 In addition, Justice Arguelles
reasoned that the therapist's peculiar knowledge of the son and the
plaintiff, combined with the very nature of the act of molestation,
provided added justification for dropping the presence requirement and
affording the plaintiff relief for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.5
6
D. Concurrence by Justice Eagleson
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Eagleson wrote separately to
express liis disagreement with the majority's use of the Molien direct
victim theory as an independent cause of action. 5 7 Justice Eagleson
stated that in Molien there was no professional relationship between
the defendant and the plaintiff when the defendant negligently mis-
153. Id. at 594-95, 770 P.2d at 285-86, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96 (Arguelles, J., concurring).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 46 (2) (1965). See also supra notes 52-56 and
accompanying text (explaining in detail the Restatement approach to intentional infliction of
emotional distress in the third party context).
154. Marlene F., 48 Cal. 3d 596, 770 P.2d at 286, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 106 (Arguelles, J.,
concurring). The Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates that there may be circumstances
when presence at the encounter may not be required in order to recover for the emotional
distress that is likely to follow. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 comment 1 (1965).
155. Marlene F., 48 Cal. 3d 596, 770 P.2d at 286, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 106 (Arguelles, J.,
concurring). The opinion looks closely at two cases in which the respective courts explicitly
recognized that the presence requirement could be dropped due to the profound and extreme
emotional consequences that stemmed from the abuse of a relationship of trust. Id. (citing
Delia S. v. Torres, 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 483-84, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787, 794-95 (1982) (court
allowed recovery to a husband not present when his wife was raped by a close friend) and
Nancy P. v. D'Amato, 401 Mass. 516, 517 N.E.2d 824, 828 (1988) (court dropped the presence
requirement when a trusted adult neighbor sexually abused a young child and the custodial
parent was not present)).
156. Marlene F., 48 Cal. 3d at 597-98, 770 P.2d at 287, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 107 (Arguelles,
J., concurring).
157. Id. at 599-601, 770 P.2d at 288-89, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 108-09 (Eagleson, J., concurring).
This concurrence was joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justice Panelli. Id.
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diagnosed the plaintiff's wife. 15 8 The defendant subsequently assumed
a duty to the plaintiff when the defendant directed that his diagnosis
of the sexually transmitted disease be communicated to the plaintiff. 1
59
Following this interpretation, Justice Eagleson stated that the Molien
court appeared to justify recovery by a plaintiff when he was victim-
ized directly by the defendant and the threat of a disease, as opposed
to creating an independent cause of action for the emotional distress
alone. 160 Justice Eagleson concluded that, since the psychotherapist
did not direct his conduct at the plaintiff, the application of Molien
was inappropriate when the only injury alleged is emotional distress.161
Having distinguished Molien, Justice Eagleson then discussed the
applicability of a cause of action for professional malpractice.
62
Justice Eagleson stated that since the plaintiff was a patient of the
defendant therapist, a duty arises to refrain from conduct that may
foreseeably aggravate or worsen the condition sought to be treated.1
3
Justice Eagleson concluded that, because sexual misconduct with
another family member who is also under treatment by the therapist
will inhibit the therapist's ability to treat the plaintiff, the defendant's
misconduct constituted professional malpractice, and the plaintiff
could recover for the defendant's negligence.1 4
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
Read most narrowly, Marlene F. represents simply an expansion
of Molien and the direct victim theory to a parent-child relation-
158. Id.
159. Id. However, the majority suggested that a duty may have been imposed by law,
given the nature of the sexually transmitted disease and the duty to warn identifiable third
parties. Id. at 590 n.5, 770 P.2d at 282 n.5, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102 n.5 (citing Tarasoff v.
Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976)).
160. Id. at 599-601, 770 P.2d at 288-89, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 108-09 (Eagleson, J., concurring).
161. Id.
162. Id at 600-01, 770 P.2d at 289, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 109 (Eagleson, J., concurring).
163. Id.
164. Id. The concurring opinion cites the same case as the majority for the notion that
abuse in a relationship of trust gives rise to foreseeable emotional distress. Id. The majority,
however, read this opinion as supporting an independent cause of action for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 591, 770 P.2d at 282-83, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03.
Justice Eagleson interpreted that opinion to support a claim for professional malpractice. Id.
at 599, 770 P.2d at 282-88, 257 Cal. Rptr at 102-08 (Eagleson, J., concurring) (citing Richard
H. v. Larry D., 198 Cal. App. 3d 591, 596, 243 Cal. Rptr. 807, 809 (1988)) (allowing the
plaintiff husband of a couple consulting a psychotherapist for marital counseling to pursue an
action for professional malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress upon discov-
ering that the doctor was engaging in sexual relations with the plaintiff's wife).
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ship. 165 Read more critically, Marlene F. creates an unworkable model
of recovery for future claims of negligent infliction of emotional
distress. In its precedential analysis, the Marlene F. court acknowl-
edged that the court's prior position, both in Dillon and in Molien,
did not purport to create a cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress based solely upon the foreseeability that serious
emotional distress might result from a defendant's conduct. 166 Rather,
emotional distress damages are recoverable in a negligence action
only when the emotional distress results from the breach of a duty
owed to the plaintiff.'67 By characterizing the plaintiff in Marlene F.
as a "direct victim," the court sacrificed any substantial duty re-
quirement that the direct victim theory of Molien encompassed, and
opened the door to unlimited liability to all foreseeable plaintiffs
who may suffer emotional distress. It is critical, therefore, to take a
closer look back at the manner in which the Molien court fashioned
its direct victim theory of recovery.
A. Should Marlene F. be a "Direct Victim"?
In the process of concluding that Marlene F. should be a direct
victim, a majority of the California Supreme Court overlooked some
of the fundamentals on which the direct victim theory is apparently
based. Recall that in Molien, it was the characterization of the
uninvolved plaintiff as a direct victim that enabled the court to find
a duty owed by the defendant, so that emotional distress damages
could be recovered. 68 Given that the Molien opinion did not delineate
any standards by which the existence of that duty may be determined,
it became difficult to define the limits of such an approach.
69
165. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (indicating an unwillingness to afford
protection outside of the bystander-witness theory when a parent-child relationship is involved).
166. Marlene F., 48 Cal. 3d at 588-89, 770 P.2d at 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
167. Id.
168. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal. 3d 916, 923, 616 P.2d 813, 816-17,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 834-35 (1980).
169. See Andalon v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 609-10, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899,
904-05 (1984) (indicating that Molien had failed to provide delimiting criteria to determine
when a plaintiff is a direct victim of negligent conduct); Newton v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,
184 Cal. App. 3d 386, 391, 228 Cal. Rptr. 890, 892-93 (1986) (predicting that the failure to
provide concrete examples of when a plaintiff is a direct victim would lead to an endless quest
for foreseeability). See also Comment, Newton v. Kaiser Hospital: Defining the Direct Victim,
18 PAc. L. J. 1303 (1987) (discussing the lack of set standards within the direct victim model
and the future of the negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of action).
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The Molien opinion itself contains two possible rationales for
creating a duty, neither of which exists in Marlene F. First, a duty
may have arisen by the defendant's simple act of instructing his
patient to inform the plaintiff of his negligent diagnosis. 170 This is a
very simple explanation for making the plaintiff a direct victim, since
the defendant directed that the plaintiff be informed.171 Alternatively,
a duty may have been imposed on the defendant by law. 72 In citing
to Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,173 the Molien
court implied that the defendant might have had a duty to warn the
plaintiff even if he had not voluntarily assumed such a duty. 74 In
Tarasoff, the California Supreme Court had previously established a
duty to protect identifiable third party victims from the dangers
posed by a physician's patient. 17 5 Applying Tarasoff, the Molien
court could have imposed a duty on the defendant to protect the
170. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.
171. Accord Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 172-73, 703 P.2d 1, 9-11, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 661, 669-71 (1985) (in rejecting the plaintiff's direct victim cause of action, the supreme
court stated that the theory of Molien applies only where the defendant's tortious conduct is
directed at both the plaintiff and the primary victim). This may, however, be considered only
dicta since the majority found that the plaintiff stated a cause of action under the bystander
approach of Dillon. Id. at 178, 703 P.2d at 14, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (Grodin, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Bird suggested that the majority's analysis of the Molien cause of action is very
narrow and would effectively limit the direct victim cause of action to the facts of Molien.
Id. at 190, 703 P.2d at 22, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
172. The Third District Court of Appeals has developed its own basis for imposing a duty
on a defendant under the direct victim theory of Molien, based on an earlier theory of duty
established by the California Supreme Court in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d
16 (1958). In Biakanja, the California Supreme Court delineated several factors to consider in
the determination of a defendant's duty to a third person not in privity of contract. Biakanja,
49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19. Those factors include the extent to which the transaction
was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm, the closeness in connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm. Id. See, e.g., Newton v. Kaiser
Hospital, 184 Cal. App. 3d 386, 228 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1986) (allowing recovery for the emotional
distress suffered by a father, who was the third party beneficiary of a contract for the delivery
of his son, who suffered from Erb's Palsey resulting from the negligence of the defendant in
his application of forceps during the child's delivery); Andalon v. Superior Court, 162 Cal.
App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984) (holding the defendant liable to foreseeable third party
beneficiaries of a contract by allowing a father to recover emotional distress damages as a
direct victim when he was not informed of a diagnostic procedure which could have detected
the presence of Down's Syndrome before his child was born). See also Green, supra note 106
(indicating a need to consider other factors in determining liability other than simply foresee-
ability). While it appears that Marlene F. stood in the third-party beneficiary position of a
contract with the psychotherapist and family unit, the California Supreme Court did not
consider the third district's approach in adopting Biakanja's duty analysis. Marlene F. v.
Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 588-92, 770 P.2d 278, 278-83, 257
Cal. Rptr. 98, 98-103 (1989).
173. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976).
174. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
175. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
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plaintiff from the possibility of contracting syphilis.' 76 Whether the
duty was assumed by the defendant or imposed on him by law, Mr.
Molien established himself as a direct victim of the defendant's
conduct, and liability attached for the emotional distress he suf-
fered.1
77
In Marlene F., however, neither theory accurately fits the facts.
First, the defendant never voluntarily assumed a duty to protect the
mother from his injurious conduct aimed at the son. On the contrary,
the defendant intentionally withheld all information from the mother
so as to prevent her from learning of the molestation.' 78 Moreover,
no evidence exists that the defendant ever took affirmative steps in
directing that the plaintiff be told of his lewd and lascivious conduct
in treating her son.'
79
As far as a duty to warn imposed by law, none could exist. In
Tarasoff, it was the plaintiff who was in imminent danger of her
assailant when the psychologist examined the defendant and created
a duty to warn the plaintiff of the possible attack.'80 In Molien, it
was again the plaintiff who was potentially in danger of contracting
syphilis when the physician examined the plaintiff's wife and created
a duty to warn the plaintiff of his diagnosis.' 8' In Marlene F.,
however, the plaintiff was not in a similar position. Unlike the
psychologist's patient in Tarasoff or Mrs. Molien in Molien, the
plaintiff's son posed no threat of physical danger to her. Tarasoff
and Molien both involved threats to plaintiffs from someone in a
position similar to that of the son. In contrast, the danger upon
which Marlene F. bases her emotional distress claim derives solely
from the conduct of the defendant and not that of the plaintiff's
176. The Tarasoff facts have previously been applied to the Dillon line of cases. See, e.g.,
Hedlund v. Superior Court of Orange County, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669 P.2d 41, 194 Cal. Rptr.
805 (1983). The related cause of action in Hedlund was the emotional distress suffered by the
son of a murder victim after witnessing the shooting of his mother by a patient of the
defendant. Id. at 704-05, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810. The son's life was spared
when his mother threw herself over him to shield him from the attack. Id. It was clear in
Hedlund that the defendant psychotherapist failed to fulfill his duty to warn the identifiable
victim that a patient had threatened to kill her. Id. While the duty to warn did not run to
the son per se, the failure to warn created a duty to those persons who may be foreseeably
injured within the Dillon guidelines of proximity. Id. at 706-07, 669 P.2d at 46-47, 194 Cal.
Rptr. at 811.
177. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.
178. Marlene F., 44 Cal. 3d at 584, 770 P.2d at 279, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
179. Id.
180. Tarasoff, at 430-32, 551 P.2d at 339-41, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19-21.
181. Molien, at 918-20, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
214
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son. 82 Under this theory of liability, the plaintiff's relationship to
her son is immaterial and Marlene F. should not qualify as a direct
victim. 83
Without a duty established between Marlene F. and the defendant,
the plaintiff should not be considered a direct victim of the defen-
dant's act. While the court repeatedly admitted that it was foreseeable
that Marlene F. would suffer emotional distress, the court's classi-
fication of her status as a direct victim undermines the viability of
such a limit on recovery as utilized in Molien.
B. Did the Court Create a New Duty?
In the Marlene F. opinion, the court announced a third situation
from which a duty may attach and provide a basis for emotional
distress damages. That duty may arise out of a special relationship
between the defendant and the plaintiff.'14 One of the most distin-
guishing facts of Marlene F. is that the plaintiff and the defendant
were already associated with one another in a professional context
before the plaintiff suffered emotional distress.85 This relationship
does not exist in either the Molien or Dillon lines of cases.
From this relationship, the court announced that it took no dra-
matic step in ruling that liability may attach for the foreseeable
emotional distress a mother will suffer upon learning that her psy-
chotherapist sexually molested her son. 86 While the court may not
have taken any dramatic steps forward, they did, however, take a
few steps backward. Previously, the court announced that recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress based solely upon the
182. This assumes that the defendant did not threaten the plaintiff with the same intimate
sexual conduct he performed with the plaintiff's son.
183. For a discussion concerning the impact of the mother-son relationship as a basis for
liability, see infra notes 179-186 and accompanying text. As far as a duty to warn based solely
on the threat of a family member suffering emotional distress, courts have held that such a
relationship does not itself constitute a basis for liability. See Holiday v. Jones, 215 Cal. App.
3d 102, 111-12, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1989) (denying the emotional distress claim of children
who witnessed their father's incarceration for murder, when the plaintiffs had no contractual
or other relationship with the defendant). In Holiday, the father's conviction was reversed on
the ground that his defense counsel was incompetent, and subsequently, the father filed an
action against the defendant for professional negligence and on behalf of his children for their
emotional distress. Id. at 105, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
184. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 590, 770
P.2d 278, 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98, 102 (1989).
185. Id. at 585, 770 P.2d at 279, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
186. Id. at 591, 770 P.2d at 281-82, 257 Cal. Rptr. 101-02 (citing Richard H. v. Larry D.,
198 Cal. App. 3d 591, 596, 243 Cal. Rptr. 807, 809 (1988)).
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foreseeability of harm would not be allowed.1 7 Yet, because the
mother was also a the defendant's patient, the foreseeability of her
emotional distress, in the court's view, served as a basis for liability.
Stated in this fashion, the court raises the issue as to whether the
plaintiff's emotional distress would be any less foreseeable if she had
not been a patient of the defendant.
In the majority opinion, the court relied on the case of Richard
H. v. Larry D.188 in fashioning relief for Marlene F. based on her
relationship to the defendant.189 In Richard H., emotional distress
damages were awarded to a patient of the defendant psychiatrist,
who had sexual relations with the patient's spouse.1 9 The court's use
of this case is unclear. Richard H. may indicate, for example, a
willingness on the part of the court to award emotional distress
damages based on the existence of two separate relationships, that
of the plaintiff to the defendant, and the plaintiff to the victim. 9'
Yet this proposition would deny recovery to a mother who learns of
her child's molestation at school, since aside from the child's school
attendance, she would not have established a relationship with the
school or the hypothetical defendant teacher.' 92
Alternatively, Richard H. may indicate a willingness on the part
of the court to award emotional distress damages based entirely on
the relationship of a plaintiff who is known to the defendant and
the foreseeability that the plaintiff will suffer genuine emotional
distress. The difficulty with this proposition is that it may sometimes
lead to an illogical result. For instance, this standard would create
liability of a physician to a patient for emotional distress damages
when a completely unrelated patient is negligently treated, based on
the defendant's preexisting relationship with the plaintiff. In either
of these two situations, creating a duty based on the relationship
between a defendant and the plaintiff does not appear to be a feasible
alternative. A duty arising in this manner denies redress where a
187. Id. at 590-91, 770 P.2d at 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. 102. See also Thing v. LaChusa, 48
Cal. 3d 644, 668, 771 P.2d 814, 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 880 (1989) (expressing concern over
the potential costs associated with using foreseeability in establishing a duty, indicating that,
"on a clear judicial day, courts can foresee forever").
188. 198 Cal. App. 3d 591, 243 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1988).
189. Marlene F., 48 Cal. 3d at 591, 770 P.2d at 283, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
190. Richard H., 198 Cal. App. 3d at 596, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
191. Marlene F., 48 Cal. 3d at 591, 770 P.2d at 283, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 103 (1989).
192. But cf. Phyllis P. v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 1196, 228 Cal. Rptr.
776, 778 (1986) (holding the defendant school liable to a plaintiff parent for the emotional
distress suffered in connection with an assaulat upon the plaintiff's daughter by a classmate,
of which the school had prior knowledge).
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plaintiff suffers genuine emotional distress, and awards damages in
cases which the California Supreme Court had previously determined
to be "out of bounds."
C. Was the Defendant Negligent?
One of the basic principles in a negligent infliction of emotional
distress cause of action is that there must be negligent conduct on
the part of the defendant. Under negligence principles, there must
be some conduct which a reasonably prudent person would not
undertake. 93 In Marlene F., the defendant's conduct was not negli-
gent. He intentionally molested the son, and subsequently did not
disclose his conduct to the plaintiff, Marlene F.
In Justice Arguelles' concurring opinion, he indicates that the
defendant's conduct meets all of the criteria for an intentional
infliction of emotional distress cause of action. 94 However, Justice
Arguelles' argument is faced with the limited circumstances in which
recovery is permitted for the emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff
who is not the immediate target of the defendant's conduct. Recall
that recovery in the third party context has been limited by the
imposition of a presence requirement, which serves to limit the claims
by outside parties who were not present during the defendant's
tortious conduct.' 95 In looking to the Restatement for guidance, it
appears that reliance on the presence requirement is justified only
where historical policy considerations would question the validity of
a cause of action.'96 Where the historical policy considerations are
greatly reduced, the arbitrary barrier created by the presence require-
ment does not serve a useful function. 97 Given the factual circum-
stances existing in Marlene F., the presence requirement should have
193. See W. KE TON, supra note 1, § 32, at 173-75.
194. Marlene F., 48 Cal. 3d at 592-93, 770 P.2d at 284-85, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 104-05
(Arguelles, J., concurring) (describing the psychotherapist's conduct as extreme and outrageous,
and exercised in reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress to Marlene
F.). See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text (describing the prima facie elements for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action).
195. See REsTATE-mENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965). See also supra notes 52-56 and
accompanying text (describing the limitation imposed by the presence requirement).
196. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text (describing the policy considerations of
unlimited liability and fictitious claims that served to impede the development of the emotional
distress torts).
197. See State Rubbish Collector's Ass'n. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338-39, 240 P.2d
282, 286-87 (1952) (rejecting the requirement of physical injury where the genuineness of the
claim may be ascertained).
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been dropped, because of the high level of assurance that the court
had as to the validity of Marlene F.'s claim.
There are two factual circumstances that provide this high level of
assurance. These circumstances do not require the court to take any
dramatic steps in fashioning a new model of recovery. The first is
the relationship of trust that existed between the plaintiff and the
defendant prior to his molestation of the plaintiff's son. As Justice
Arguelles points out, the abuse of this relationship of trust com-
pounds the outrageousness of the conduct and makes less essential
the presence requirement.198 By previously establishing a relationship
with the defendant, the interests of the plaintiff are known to the
defendant when he commits the tort. The purpose of the presence
requirement is satisfied by the defendant's association with the plain-
tiff prior to the contemplation of the defendant's act. Allowing
recovery without the plaintiff's presence does not create the fear of
unlimited liability for the defendant.
The second factual circumstance that exists in Marlene F. is the
plaintiff's relationship to the primary victim. This factual circum-
stance addresses the second major historical policy consideration: the
genuineness of the claim. While it may safely be assumed that a
witness who is present during the defendant's tortious conduct toward
a third person would suffer emotional distress, it would appear
equally logical that close family members of the victim who are not
present will suffer to the same degree, if not greater. 99
With the assurances brought about by the relationship of the
plaintiff to the defendant, and the plaintiff to the primary victim,
the presence requirement serves as an arbitrary barrier, barring relief
to a limited number of individuals suffering from genuine emotional
distress. Advocating the dropping of this arbitrary barrier in light of
the facts in Marlene F. is not without merit. Fashioning relief for
Marlene F. in this manner maintains the integrity of the standards
set forth in Dillon and Molien for cases involving the negligent
infliction of emotional distress to plaintiffs other than the primary
victim. Moreover, dropping the presence requirement would create
198. Marlene F., 48 Cal. 3d at 595-96, 770 P.2d at 286, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 106 (Arguelles,
J., concurring).
199. Cf. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 741, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76
(1968) (using the degree to which the plaintiff and the victim were related as a factor to
determine the foreseeability of harm); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112-13, 443 P.2d
561, 565-66, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103-04 (1968) (using the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury as a factor to determine the liability of the defendant in a negligence action).
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an expansion within the law of intentional torts which would redress
genuine claims of emotional distress intentionally inflicted.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., the
California Supreme Court awarded damages on the grounds of
negligent infliction of emotional distress to a plaintiff who was neither
present during the defendant's tortious conduct, nor established as a
direct victim of the defendant's conduct. After Marlene F., the
likelihood that the direct victim theory first announced in Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals will be read narrowly is remote. Plain-
tiffs, who were previously denied emotional distress damages because
they could not establish conduct directed at them by the defendant,
may now state a cause of action. The ramifications of expanding the
direct victim theory, are the flooding of courts with fictitious and
trivial claims, and subjecting the defendant to unlimited liability:
historical policy considerations which previously served to impede
the evolution of the emotional distress torts.
The facts of Marlene F. lend support, however, to the adoption
of a new approach to the intentional tort of emotional distress.
Where the plaintiff's prior relationship both with the defendant and
the primary victim serve to compound the outrageousness of the
conduct, the court should not be burdened with the arbitrary presence
requirement when ascertaining the validity of the distress claim. While
this approach is embraced solely by a concurring opinion in a
California Supreme Court decision, concurring opinions with the
foundational support advocated in this casenote have played an
important role in the future of California's case law.
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200. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (advocating the adoption of a strict products liability theory
in assessing liability for an exploding carbonated beverage bottle). In 1963, Justice Traynor
wrote for the majority of the court in the case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), in which he delineated his strict
products liability theory from Escola and formed the basis for products liability in California.

